@aws-amplify/amplify-category-interactions
amplify-cli interactions plugin
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Provider-dispatch pattern in Amplify CLI; result.providerName is controlled by internal service selection, not arbitrary user input. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:fuzzy | AI (phantom-deps): fuzzy is listed in package.json dependencies; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1.39 | 5 / 0 | |
| 5.1.38 | 5 / 0 | |
| 5.1.37 | 5 / 0 | |
| 5.1.36 | 5 / 0 | |
| 5.1.35 | 5 / 0 |
v5.1.39
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.38
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.37
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.36
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.