@aws-amplify/amplify-environment-parameters
Amplify CLI environment parameter manager
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Official AWS Amplify CLI package; provenance attestation not used by this publisher across their releases. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.9.25 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.9.24 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.9.23 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.9.22 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.9.21 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.9.20 | 3 / 3 |
v1.9.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.