@aws-amplify/auth
Auth category of aws-amplify
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aws-amplify/common | AI (dependencies): @aws-amplify/common is a sibling package in the same AWS Amplify monorepo; expected dependency for all versions of this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:aws-sdk | AI (dependencies): aws-sdk is a core AWS dependency expected for @aws-amplify/auth; stable and legitimate for this package across all versions. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-dropped | AI (source-diff): Pre-release version of monorepo package; source size variations are expected and benign in this context. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-peer-dep:react-native | AI (dependencies): react-native is a legitimate peer dependency for auth library; expected for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/aws-amplify-auth.min.js | AI (source-diff): Minified bundle for a major AWS library; long encoded strings are standard minification artifacts. Sample confirms safe-buffer/process polyfill code, not malicious payloads. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aws-amplify/cache | AI (dependencies): Internal AWS Amplify monorepo dependency; same org scope and legitimate internal coupling. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): AWS Amplify publishes many packages with templated names by design; this is a known false positive for the aws-amplify org scope. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:toplevel-fetch | AI (semgrep): Fetch call is part of Cognito auth flow (launchUri handler); legitimate use, not data exfiltration. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@aws-amplify/cache | AI (phantom-deps): Expected monorepo internal dependency pattern; same org scope. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Provenance not yet enabled; not a security disqualifier for established AWS package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers (amzn-oss, jamesiri, jpeddicord) reflect AWS organizational changes within the official Amplify project, not a takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): crypto-js is established library appropriate for auth package; no supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of richardzcode is part of legitimate maintainer transition within AWS Amplify; combined with new AWS maintainers, indicates organizational restructuring, not compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Documented AWS organizational transition in 2020; legitimate maintainer handoff. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decoding is legitimate Cognito auth protocol handling, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): 55 new files reflect normal package evolution; no bundled/injected code indicators. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aws-amplify/core | AI (dependencies): Internal AWS Amplify dependency within same organization scope; monorepo pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 43 of 143)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.2.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.2.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.2.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.1.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.1.8 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.1.7 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.1.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.6.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.6.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.5.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.4.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.2.18 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.17 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.16 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.15 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.14 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.13 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.12 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.11 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.10 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.9 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.8 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.7 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.6 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.5 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.4 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.3 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.2 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.2.1 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.1.2 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.1.1 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.1.0 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.0.8 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.0.7 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.0.6 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.0.5 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.0.4 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.0.3 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.0.2 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.0.1 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 21 | |
| 0.0.1 | 5 / 22 |
v3.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.18
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.2.17
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.2.16
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.2.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.