@aws-crypto/material-management
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known implicit dependency of TypeScript; stable across versions. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Missing metadata (description, repo, keywords) is benign for AWS internal package; not a spam indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.0.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 5.0.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 5.0.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.2.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.2.2 | 4 / 0 |
v5.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (aws-crypto-tools-ci-bot) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.