@axa-fr/design-system-apollo-css
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA attestation; consistent with org-level CI/CD migration for AxaFrance design-system. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal aligns with org-level CI/CD takeover of publishing; no malicious indicators present. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@axa-fr/canopee-css | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope dependency; likely a CSS base package consumed at build time rather than via direct import. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.6.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.5.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.4.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.2.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 3.1.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 3.1.0 | 0 / 5 |
v4.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.