@backstage/catalog-model
Types and validators that help describe the model of a Backstage Catalog
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/types | AI (dependencies): @backstage/types is a first-party Backstage monorepo package; unvetted status is a registry bootstrapping artifact, not a real risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/errors | AI (dependencies): @backstage/errors is a first-party Backstage monorepo package; unvetted status is a registry bootstrapping artifact, not a real risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Backstage does not publish with Sigstore provenance; consistent across all their packages and not a meaningful risk signal for this well-established project. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.9.0 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1.8.0 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1.7.7 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.7.6 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.7.5 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.7.4 | 4 / 4 |
v1.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.