@backstage/config
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/types | AI (dependencies): @backstage/types is a first-party Backstage monorepo package; it is a legitimate dependency for any @backstage/* package and poses no risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/errors | AI (dependencies): @backstage/errors is a first-party Backstage monorepo package; it is a legitimate dependency for any @backstage/* package and poses no risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Backstage packages historically do not publish Sigstore provenance; the package's legitimacy is well-established through its long history and download volume. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.8 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.3.7 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.3.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.3.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.3.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.3.3 | 3 / 2 |
v1.3.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.