@backstage/integration-react
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@material-ui/icons | AI (dependencies): @material-ui/icons is a well-known, widely-used Material UI package; its use as a dependency in Backstage UI packages is standard and expected across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Backstage monorepo packages are published without Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across all versions and not a security concern given the package's established history. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo sub-packages routinely lack keywords and detailed READMEs; this is a cosmetic artifact of the Backstage monorepo structure, not a spam indicator. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@material-ui/core | AI (phantom-deps): @material-ui/core is a legitimate peer/dependency in the Material-UI ecosystem; phantom classification is a packaging quirk, not a security concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.18 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.17 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.16 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.15 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.14 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.13 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.12 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.11 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.10 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.9 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.8 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.2.7 | 5 / 11 |
v1.2.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.