@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/types | AI (dependencies): First-party Backstage package from the official monorepo; stable dependency for all @backstage/* packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/backend-plugin-api | AI (dependencies): First-party Backstage package from the official monorepo; core API dependency for all Backstage backend plugins. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:codeowners-utils | AI (dependencies): Well-known utility for parsing CODEOWNERS files; legitimate dependency for catalog backend functionality. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:express | AI (phantom-deps): Express is a legitimate runtime dependency for this Backstage backend plugin; the phantom-dep finding reflects indirect usage patterns common in the Backstage framework. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Backstage monorepo package with 135k weekly downloads and 1956 versions; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a disqualifier given the package's track record. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.7.1 | 34 / 16 | |
| 3.7.0 | 34 / 16 | |
| 3.6.1 | 35 / 18 | |
| 3.6.0 | 35 / 18 | |
| 3.5.0 | 33 / 17 | |
| 3.4.0 | 33 / 17 | |
| 3.3.2 | 31 / 17 | |
| 3.3.1 | 31 / 17 | |
| 3.3.0 | 31 / 17 | |
| 3.2.0 | 31 / 17 | |
| 3.1.2 | 31 / 17 | |
| 3.1.1 | 31 / 17 | |
| 3.1.0 | 31 / 17 | |
| 3.0.1 | 31 / 17 | |
| 3.0.0 | 31 / 17 |
v3.7.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.