@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend-module-aws
A Backstage catalog backend module that helps integrate towards AWS
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aws-sdk/client-eks | AI (dependencies): Official AWS SDK v3 package from Amazon; expected dependency for an AWS-integration Backstage plugin. Stable across versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aws-sdk/client-organizations | AI (dependencies): Official AWS SDK v3 package from Amazon; expected dependency for an AWS-integration Backstage plugin. Stable across versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@backstage/backend-defaults | AI (phantom-deps): Declared but not directly imported; common in Backstage monorepo packages where deps are managed at workspace level. Not a security concern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Official Backstage monorepo package published without Sigstore provenance; consistent with their release pipeline. Not a security risk given package age and ecosystem trust. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.23 | 16 / 6 | |
| 0.4.22 | 17 / 6 | |
| 0.4.21 | 17 / 6 | |
| 0.4.20 | 17 / 6 | |
| 0.4.19 | 17 / 6 | |
| 0.4.18 | 17 / 6 | |
| 0.4.17 | 17 / 6 | |
| 0.4.16 | 17 / 6 | |
| 0.4.15 | 19 / 7 | |
| 0.4.14 | 19 / 7 | |
| 0.4.13 | 19 / 7 | |
| 0.4.12 | 19 / 7 | |
| 0.4.11 | 19 / 7 |
v0.4.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.