@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend-module-gerrit
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/config | AI (dependencies): Official @backstage/* monorepo dependency; legitimate and well-established ecosystem package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/errors | AI (dependencies): Official @backstage/* monorepo dependency; legitimate and well-established ecosystem package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/integration | AI (dependencies): Official @backstage/* monorepo dependency; legitimate and well-established ecosystem package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/backend-plugin-api | AI (dependencies): Official @backstage/* monorepo dependency; legitimate and well-established ecosystem package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/plugin-catalog-node | AI (dependencies): Official @backstage/* monorepo dependency; legitimate and well-established ecosystem package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@backstage/plugin-catalog-common | AI (dependencies): Official @backstage/* monorepo dependency; legitimate and well-established ecosystem package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo sub-packages commonly lack standalone descriptions/keywords/README code blocks; not indicative of spam or malice. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Common pattern for Backstage monorepo sub-packages; not a malice indicator. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:fs-extra | AI (phantom-deps): fs-extra is a legitimate declared dependency; phantom detection may reflect indirect/config usage in monorepo context. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@backstage/plugin-catalog-common | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; may be used in type-only or indirect positions. Not a risk signal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Provenance is absent but this is common (~88% of npm packages); package age, download count, and repo alignment provide sufficient trust. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.14 | 8 / 4 | |
| 0.3.13 | 9 / 4 | |
| 0.3.12 | 9 / 4 | |
| 0.3.11 | 9 / 4 | |
| 0.3.10 | 9 / 4 | |
| 0.3.9 | 9 / 4 | |
| 0.3.8 | 9 / 4 | |
| 0.3.7 | 9 / 4 | |
| 0.3.6 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.3.5 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.3.4 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.3.3 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.3.2 | 9 / 5 |
v0.3.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.