@backstage/plugin-catalog-common
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Common-library package in the Backstage monorepo; minimal runtime code and terse README are expected for this package type. Not spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.10 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.1.9 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.1.8 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.1.7 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.1.6 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.1.5 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.1.4 | 3 / 1 |
v1.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.