@backstage/plugin-search-common
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Common-library package in the Backstage monorepo; minimal CJS entry and terse README are expected for this package type, not spam indicators. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.24 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.2.23 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.2.22 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.2.21 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.2.20 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.2.19 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.2.18 | 2 / 1 |
v1.2.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.