@balancer/sdk
SDK for interacting with the Balancer protocol
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@balancer-labs/balancer-maths | AI (dependencies): First-party Balancer Labs math library; expected dependency for this SDK across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2.9 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.2.8 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.2.7 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.2.6 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.2.5 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.2.4 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.2.3 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.2.2 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.2.1 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.2.0 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.1.3 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.1.2 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.1.1 | 2 / 20 | |
| 5.1.0 | 2 / 19 | |
| 5.0.1 | 5 / 19 | |
| 5.0.0 | 5 / 19 | |
| 4.10.1 | 5 / 19 | |
| 4.10.0 | 5 / 19 | |
| 4.9.0 | 5 / 19 |
v5.2.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (johngrantuk) than the most recent previously approved version (brunoguerios) on 2026-03-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (brunoguerios) than the most recent previously approved version (mikeraymcdonald) on 2025-12-16, but brunoguerios is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.10.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.