@bananapus/project-payer-v6
Deploys payable addresses that automatically route received ETH or ERC20 tokens to a Juicebox V6 project treasury, giving every project a simple payable address.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@uniswap/permit2 | AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned devDep only; Uniswap/permit2 is a canonical Foundry devDep in DeFi projects, not shipped to consumers. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bananapus/core-v6 | AI (phantom-deps): Solidity package; dependencies are consumed by Foundry tooling via remappings, not JS imports. Phantom-dep false positive is stable for this package type. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@openzeppelin/contracts | AI (phantom-deps): Solidity package; @openzeppelin/contracts is referenced via Foundry config/remappings, not JS imports. Expected pattern for this package type. | ai |
Versions (showing 22 of 22)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.24 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.23 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.22 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.21 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.20 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.19 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.18 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.17 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.14 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.13 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.12 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.11 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.10 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.9 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.8 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.7 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 1 |
v0.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
2 findingsDependency '@uniswap/permit2' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:Uniswap/permit2#cc56ad0f3439c502c246fc5cfcc3db92bb8b7219' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.