@bcc-code/bcc-pubsub-node-sdk
NodeJS client for bcc-code/bcc-pubsub-node-sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:request | AI (dependencies): request is a deprecated but widely-used HTTP library; no active CVEs blocking this package's use case. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped org package (@bcc-code); sparse metadata is typical for internal SDKs, not a spam/malware indicator. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:sinon | AI (phantom-deps): Test stub library; phantom-dep fires because it's in dependencies instead of devDependencies, not a security issue. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/sinon | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package misplaced in dependencies; no security risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/request | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package misplaced in dependencies; no security risk. | ai |
v3.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.