@bejibun/utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): luxon is a well-known date library; @bejibun/logger is an in-ecosystem sibling package from the same author. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase explained by addition of @bejibun/logger dependency and its associated source files. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): 21 new files consistent with bundling @bejibun/logger from same author/namespace. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Common for small ecosystem packages; no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.28 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.27 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.26 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.25 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.24 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.23 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.22 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.21 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.20 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.19 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.17 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.15 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.1.14 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.1.13 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.12 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.11 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 2 |
v0.1.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.17
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: crenata.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.15
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: crenata.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.14
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: crenata.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.