@better-s3/react
React hooks for S3-compatible file uploads, downloads, and deletes
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): hamidrezakz matched as known maintainer by email on prior approved versions; legitimate transfer, not a hijack. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): New package without provenance is common; no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1048.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.1047.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.1046.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.1045.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.1045.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.1045.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.1044.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.3.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.2.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.2.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.1.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.3.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.3.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 4 |
v3.1048.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (houk) were replaced by new maintainers (hamidrezakz). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (hamidrezakz) than the most recent previously approved version (houk) on 2026-05-31, but hamidrezakz is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.1047.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (houk) were replaced by new maintainers (hamidrezakz). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (hamidrezakz) than the most recent previously approved version (houk) on 2026-05-30, but hamidrezakz is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.1046.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1045.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1045.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1045.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1044.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.