@better-webhook/cli
Modern CLI for developing, capturing, and replaying webhooks locally with dashboard UI.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/dashboard/assets/index-BSfTbn4Y.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled React dashboard asset; minified frontend code, not obfuscation. Stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/dashboard/assets/index-CZZLwai4.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite-bundled React dashboard asset; minified but not obfuscated — sample shows normal React runtime patterns. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance attestation; legitimate automation pattern. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/dashboard/assets/index-Dlqdzwyc.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled React dashboard asset; minified frontend bundle, not obfuscated malware. Stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/dashboard/assets/index-Mir6leOJ.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-minified React dashboard bundle; expected artifact for a CLI with embedded dashboard UI. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Tiny payload is expected for a binary wrapper shim; README brevity is consistent with a sub-package in a monorepo. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:endalk200 | AI (email-domain): Author field uses GitHub handle as email placeholder, not a real domain; repo and SLSA provenance confirm legitimate publisher. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is the intentional initial version of a new wrapper sub-package in an established monorepo with 23 versions and SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-dropped | AI (source-diff): Size drop reflects intentional refactor to a thin npm wrapper delegating to platform-specific optional dep packages. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped webhook CLI package; Levenshtein match to joi is a false positive with no semantic or functional similarity. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:chalk | AI (phantom-deps): chalk is a declared runtime dep in a bundled CLI; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for bundled packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ora | AI (phantom-deps): ora is a declared runtime dep in a bundled CLI; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for bundled packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.10.1 | 8 / 9 | |
| 3.10.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 3.9.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 3.8.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 3.7.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 3.6.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 3.5.0 | 8 / 8 | |
| 3.4.4 | 8 / 8 | |
| 3.4.3 | 8 / 8 | |
| 3.4.2 | 8 / 8 | |
| 3.4.1 | 8 / 8 | |
| 3.4.0 | 8 / 8 | |
| 3.3.0 | 8 / 8 | |
| 3.2.0 | 8 / 8 | |
| 3.1.0 | 8 / 8 | |
| 3.0.0 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v3.10.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'endalk200' uses domain 'endalk200' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.9.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.7.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.3
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'endalk200' uses domain 'endalk200' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.