@binance/w3w-blocknative-connector
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Binance internal connector package; sparse metadata is consistent across all versions of this org's packages. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Stable pattern across this org's packages; not indicative of malice. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@binance/w3w-utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; likely re-exported or used indirectly via bundled output. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.12 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.1.11 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.1.10 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.1.9 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.1.8 | 3 / 1 |
v1.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.