@binance/w3w-ethereum-provider
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established @binance scoped package family; sparse metadata is a style choice, not a spam/malice indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent across the @binance/w3w-* package family; not indicative of malice. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.13 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.1.12 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.1.11 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.1.10 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.1.9 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.1.8 | 6 / 0 |
v1.1.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.