@biomejs/cli-linux-arm64-musl
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Biome migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate automated pipeline. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Gap reflects CI pipeline migration for this platform-specific package, not account takeover. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer siketyan is a known Biome contributor; consistent with legitimate project growth. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary shim packages are intentionally minimal with no deps, keywords, or description. | ai |
Versions (showing 34 of 34)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.5.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.5.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.5.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.5.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.16 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v2.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.6
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (ematipico) on 2025-11-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.3.5
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (ematipico) than the most recent previously approved version (dominionl) on 2025-11-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.