@bitgo/key-card
key card generator for BitGo wallets
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/upgradeWalletEncryption.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled TS build output with descriptive header, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): fp-ts/io-ts are established, well-vetted FP libraries used across BitGo SDK. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/extractKeycardFromPDF.js | AI (source-diff): TypeScript compiler output; long lines from bundled pdfjs-dist content, not malicious obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/parseKeycard.js | AI (source-diff): Readable PDF parsing logic in compiled TS output; long lines are incidental to bundled deps. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Individual BitGo developer accounts replaced by org bot; consistent org-wide pattern. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): BitGo org-wide consolidation to bitgobot CI publisher; consistent across their monorepo packages. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): bitgobot is BitGo's CI publisher account with 90 approved packages. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): pranavjain is an established BitGo org publisher (54 approved); routine maintainer rotation within the org. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established SDK sub-package; sparse README and no keywords are expected for internal monorepo modules. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 154)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.34.1 | 9 / 1 | |
| 0.34.0 | 9 / 1 | |
| 0.33.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.32.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.31.6 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.31.5 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.31.4 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.31.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.31.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.31.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.31.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.30.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.29.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.29.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.29.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.29.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.29.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.29.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.29.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.41 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.40 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.39 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.38 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.37 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.36 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.35 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.34 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.33 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.32 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.31 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.30 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.29 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.28 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.27 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.26 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.25 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.24 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.22 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.21 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.20 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.19 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.18 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.17 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.16 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.15 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.14 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.13 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.12 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.11 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.10 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.28.9 | 5 / 1 |
v0.34.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.34.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.33.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.32.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.31.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.31.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.