@bitgo/sdk-coin-dash
BitGo SDK coin library for Dash
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): BitGo migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): louib-bitgo is a BitGo org member; addition consistent with normal team growth at this publisher. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): BitGo publishes via CI bot without Sigstore attestation; consistent across all their packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; expected and stable for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/abstract-utxo | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; expected and stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 155)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.8.27 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.26 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.25 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.23 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.22 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.21 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.20 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.19 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.18 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.17 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.16 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.15 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.14 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.13 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.12 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.11 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.8.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.7.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.7.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.7.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.7.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.7.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.7.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.7.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.7.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.7.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.7.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.5.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.5.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.5.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.5.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.5.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.5.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.4.7 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.4.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.4.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.4.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.4.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.4.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.4.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.4.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.3.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.3.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.3.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.3.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.3.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.15 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.14 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.13 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.12 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.11 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.10 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.9 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.8 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.7 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.33 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.32 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.31 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.30 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.29 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.28 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.27 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.26 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.25 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.24 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.23 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.22 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.21 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.20 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.19 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.18 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.17 | 3 / 2 |
v2.8.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.