@bitgo/sdk-coin-etc
BitGo SDK coin library for Ethereum classic
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): zahin-mohammad is an established BitGo publisher (62 approved, 0 rejected); internal team account rotation, not a takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): BitGo SDK packages consistently publish without Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; expected for this SDK package family. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/abstract-eth | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; expected for this SDK package family. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-coin-eth | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; expected for this SDK package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 149)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.4 | 11 / 2 | |
| 3.0.3 | 11 / 2 | |
| 3.0.1 | 11 / 2 | |
| 3.0.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.11 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.10 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.9 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.8 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.7 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.6 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.5 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.4 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.3 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.2 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.1 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.8.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.7.9 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.7.8 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.7.7 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.7.6 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.7.5 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.7.4 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.7.3 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.7.2 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.7.1 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.7.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.6.9 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.6.8 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.6.7 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.6.6 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.6.5 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.6.4 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.6.3 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.6.2 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.6.1 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.6.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.24 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.22 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.21 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.20 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.19 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.18 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.17 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.16 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.15 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.14 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.13 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.12 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.11 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.10 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.9 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.8 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.7 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.6 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.2 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.1 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.5.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.4.4 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.4.3 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.4.2 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.4.1 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.4.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.14 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.13 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.12 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.11 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.10 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.9 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.8 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.7 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.6 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.5 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.4 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.3 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.2 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.1 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.3.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.50 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.49 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.48 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.47 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.46 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.45 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.44 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.43 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.42 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.41 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.40 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.39 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.38 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.37 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.36 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.35 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.34 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.33 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.32 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.31 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.30 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.29 | 11 / 2 | |
| 2.2.27 | 11 / 2 |
v3.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.40
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.39
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.38
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.37
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.36
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.33
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.32
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.31
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.30
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.