@bitgo/sdk-coin-ltc
BitGo SDK coin library for Litecoin
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/index.js | AI (source-diff): File is compiled TypeScript test output, not obfuscated; long lines are from inline test data strings. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): BitGo org-level maintainer rotation; bitgobot is a verified automation account with strong track record. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Bulk removal consistent with BitGo consolidating to bot-based publishing; not indicative of takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Both publishers are BitGo org accounts; internal maintainer rotation within a well-established org package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; expected and stable for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/abstract-utxo | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; expected and stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 78)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.8.15 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.14 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.13 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.12 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.11 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.7.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.7.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.7.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.7.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.7.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.7.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.7.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.7.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.7.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.7.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.5.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.5.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.5.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.5.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.5.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.5.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.4.7 | 3 / 2 | |
| 3.4.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 3.4.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 3.4.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 3.4.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 3.4.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 3.4.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 3.4.0 | 3 / 2 |
v3.8.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.7.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.7.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.7.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.7.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.4.4
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.3
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.