@bitgo/sdk-coin-rbtc
BitGo SDK coin library for Rootstock rsk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): New publisher is an established BitGo org account (62 approved, 0 rejected); consistent with internal team rotation. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): BitGo SDK packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; expected for this SDK package family. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/abstract-eth | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; expected for this SDK package family. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-coin-eth | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; expected for this SDK package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 76)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.5.14 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.13 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.12 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.11 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.10 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.9 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.8 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.7 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.6 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.5 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.4 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.3 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.2 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.1 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.5.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.4.9 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.4.8 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.4.7 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.4.6 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.4.5 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.4.4 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.4.3 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.4.2 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.4.1 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.4.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.24 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.22 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.21 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.20 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.19 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.18 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.17 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.16 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.15 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.14 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.13 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.12 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.11 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.10 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.9 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.8 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.7 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.6 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.5 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.4 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.3 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.2 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.1 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.3.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.2.4 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.2.3 | 6 / 2 |
v2.5.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.