@bitgo/sdk-coin-trx
BitGo SDK coin library for Tron
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/test/resources.js | AI (source-diff): Long strings are Tron raw_data_hex test fixtures; expected in a TRX SDK. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/test/unit/transactionBuilder/freezeBalanceTxBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Long strings are hex-encoded Tron transaction protobuf test vectors, not payloads. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/test/unit/verifyTransaction.js | AI (source-diff): Long string is a TRC20 TriggerSmartContract protobuf hex used in a defense-in-depth test. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/accountCreateTxBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): TypeScript compiled output; readable class structure with no obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/transactionBuilder/accountCreateTxBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled test file; standard CJS output with no obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/trxToken.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled test file; long lines are hex-encoded Tron protobuf test fixtures. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): BitGo migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this org. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/test/unit/transactionBuilder/tokenTransferBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Long hex string is a TRX transaction fixture in a test file, not an obfuscated payload. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): louib-bitgo is a BitGo org maintainer; consistent with normal team management. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stablelib/hex | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/secp256k1 | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org declared dep; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ethers | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep in package.json for this TRX SDK; phantom-dep heuristic false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tronweb | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep; core dependency for Tron coin SDK. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:secp256k1 | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:superagent | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bignumber.js | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/statics | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org declared dep; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org declared dep; stable false positive. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): BitGo SDK packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; stable pattern across all @bitgo/sdk-coin-* packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-lib-mpc | AI (dependencies): Internal BitGo monorepo dependency; stable pattern across all @bitgo/sdk-coin-* packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 75)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.16.2 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.16.1 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.16.0 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.15.2 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.15.1 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.15.0 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.14.0 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.13.7 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.13.6 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.13.5 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.13.4 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.13.3 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.13.2 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.13.1 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.13.0 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.12.0 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.11.1 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.11.0 | 13 / 3 | |
| 3.10.1 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.10.0 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.9.4 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.9.3 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.9.2 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.9.1 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.9.0 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.8.4 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.8.2 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.8.1 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.8.0 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.16 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.15 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.14 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.13 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.12 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.11 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.10 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.9 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.8 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.7 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.6 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.5 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.4 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.3 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.2 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.7.1 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.6.2 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.6.1 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.6.0 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.5.4 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.5.3 | 12 / 3 | |
| 3.5.2 | 12 / 3 |
v3.16.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.16.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.16.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.15.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.15.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.15.0
7 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 15 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.14.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.9.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.9.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.9.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.9.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.8.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.5.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (pranavjain) than the most recent previously approved version (zahin-mohammad) on 2025-09-03, but pranavjain is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.