@bitgo/sdk-coin-xrp
BitGo SDK coin library for Ripple
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/xrpToken.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/transactionBuilderFactory.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/transferBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/trustsetBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/utils.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/walletInitializationBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/xrp.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/accountSetBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/iface.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/keyPair.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/ripple.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/tokenTransferBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/transaction.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/transactionBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc CJS output with inline sourcemap; long line is base64 sourceMappingURL, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): BitGo consolidated publishing under bitgobot bot account; stable org-level transition, not a takeover. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): bitgobot is a trusted BitGo automation account with 774 approved packages; addition is part of org-wide consolidation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of individual BitGo employee accounts in favor of bot account is consistent with org policy change, not a takeover. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/lib/accountDeleteBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsc-compiled output; long lines are normal for TypeScript class bundles, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): BitGo SDK packages consistently lack provenance attestation; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (dependencies): First-party BitGo monorepo dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 73)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.14.3 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.14.2 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.14.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.14.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.13.7 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.13.6 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.13.5 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.13.4 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.13.3 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.13.2 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.13.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.13.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.9 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.8 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.7 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.6 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.5 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.4 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.3 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.2 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.24 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.22 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.21 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.20 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.19 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.18 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.17 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.16 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.15 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.14 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.13 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.12 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.11 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.10 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.9 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.8 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.7 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.6 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.5 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.4 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.3 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.2 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.10.4 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.10.3 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.10.2 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.10.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.10.0 | 8 / 2 |
v3.14.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.14.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.14.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.14.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.12.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.12.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.12.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.12.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.12.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.11.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.10.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.10.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zahin-mohammad) than the most recent previously approved version (pranavjain) on 2025-08-30, but zahin-mohammad is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.10.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zahin-mohammad) than the most recent previously approved version (pranavjain) on 2025-08-29, but zahin-mohammad is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.10.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.10.0
15 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.