@bitgo/sdk-coin-xtz
BitGo SDK coin library for Tezos
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/test/unit/offlineTransactionBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Long hex strings are Tezos transaction broadcast format test vectors, not obfuscated payloads. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/test/unit/transactionBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Long encoded strings are Tezos tx hex and base58 signatures used as test fixtures; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/keyPair.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled TS test file; long lines are TypeScript boilerplate, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/offlineTransactionBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled TS test file; readable test code with long lines from boilerplate. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/resources.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled TS test resources with long hex fixture strings; not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/transaction.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled TS test file; long lines are TypeScript boilerplate. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/transactionBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled TS test file; long lines are TypeScript boilerplate. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/transferBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled TS test file; readable test code with long lines from boilerplate. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/xtz.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled TS test file; long lines are TypeScript boilerplate. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/util.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled TS test file; long lines are TypeScript boilerplate. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/fixtures.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled TS test fixture with long hex strings; not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@taquito/local-forging | AI (phantom-deps): Tezos SDK dep; monorepo config reference pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:libsodium-wrappers | AI (phantom-deps): Tezos crypto dep; monorepo config reference pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo SDK package; deps declared at package level but imported via shared modules. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bs58check | AI (phantom-deps): Same monorepo pattern; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:superagent | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dep used via config/shared modules in monorepo; not a direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bignumber.js | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo SDK; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@noble/curves | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo SDK; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/blake2b | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; monorepo pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/statics | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; monorepo pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; monorepo pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@taquito/signer | AI (phantom-deps): Tezos SDK dep; monorepo config reference pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/secp256k1 | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; monorepo pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): BitGo SDK packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (dependencies): First-party BitGo sibling package; stable dependency across all versions of this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 76)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.11.4 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.11.3 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.11.2 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.11.1 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.11.0 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.10.9 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.10.8 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.10.7 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.10.6 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.10.5 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.10.4 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.10.3 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.10.2 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.10.1 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.10.0 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.9.9 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.9.8 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.9.7 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.9.6 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.9.5 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.9.4 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.9.3 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.9.2 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.9.1 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.9.0 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.24 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.22 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.21 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.20 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.19 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.18 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.17 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.16 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.15 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.14 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.13 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.12 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.11 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.10 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.9 | 13 / 2 | |
| 2.8.8 | 12 / 2 | |
| 2.8.7 | 12 / 2 | |
| 2.8.6 | 12 / 2 | |
| 2.8.5 | 12 / 2 | |
| 2.8.4 | 12 / 2 | |
| 2.8.3 | 12 / 2 | |
| 2.8.2 | 12 / 2 | |
| 2.8.1 | 12 / 2 | |
| 2.8.0 | 12 / 2 | |
| 2.7.4 | 12 / 2 | |
| 2.7.3 | 12 / 2 |
v2.11.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.11.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.11.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.11.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.9.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.9.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.9.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.9.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.9.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.18
2 findingsModified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.17
2 findingsModified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.16
2 findingsModified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.15
2 findingsModified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.14
2 findingsModified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.13
2 findingsModified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.12
2 findingsModified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.10
3 findingsModified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.9
3 findingsModified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.3
10 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.7.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (pranavjain) than the most recent previously approved version (zahin-mohammad) on 2025-09-03, but pranavjain is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.7.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.