@bitgo/sdk-coin-zketh
BitGo SDK coin library for zkSync
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance attestation; consistent with BitGo CI/CD migration. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/resources.js | AI (source-diff): Long lines are hex-encoded Ethereum transaction test data, not obfuscated malware; stable pattern for BitGo SDK test fixtures. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/transactionBuilder/send.js | AI (source-diff): Standard TypeScript-compiled test file with long hex test vectors; not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/transaction.js | AI (source-diff): Standard TypeScript-compiled test file; long lines are test data, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/transferBuilder.js | AI (source-diff): Standard TypeScript-compiled test file; long lines are test data, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/zketh.js | AI (source-diff): Standard TypeScript-compiled test file; long lines are test data, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/unit/zkethToken.js | AI (source-diff): Standard TypeScript-compiled test file with base64 sourcemap; not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/resources.d.ts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file with long hex-encoded transaction constant; test data, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): BitGo org-wide shift to bot-based publishing (bitgobot) with SLSA provenance; not a hijack. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test/fixtures/zketh.js | AI (source-diff): Test fixture file with long hex response data; not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/secp256k1 | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency within BitGo monorepo; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 76)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.7.14 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.13 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.12 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.11 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.10 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.9 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.8 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.7 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.6 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.7.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.6.9 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.6.8 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.6.7 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.6.6 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.6.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.6.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.6.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.6.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.6.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.6.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.5.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.5.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.5.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.5.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.19 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.18 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.17 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.16 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.15 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.14 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.13 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.12 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.11 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.10 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.9 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.8 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.7 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.6 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.4.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.3.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 2.3.3 | 5 / 3 |
v2.7.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.5
11 findingsAll previous maintainers (pengyuc_bitgo, dhoffmann, bitgoaaron, mmcshinsky-bitgo, ericcrosson-bitgo, johntzanakakisbitgo, margueriteblair, pranavjain, islamaminbitgo, mkottaichamy, zahin-mohammad, mohammadalfaiyaz_bitgo) were replaced by new maintainers (louib-bitgo, bitgobot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.4
11 findingsAll previous maintainers (pengyuc_bitgo, dhoffmann, bitgoaaron, mmcshinsky-bitgo, ericcrosson-bitgo, johntzanakakisbitgo, margueriteblair, pranavjain, islamaminbitgo, mkottaichamy, zahin-mohammad, mohammadalfaiyaz_bitgo) were replaced by new maintainers (louib-bitgo, bitgobot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.3
11 findingsAll previous maintainers (pengyuc_bitgo, dhoffmann, bitgoaaron, mmcshinsky-bitgo, ericcrosson-bitgo, johntzanakakisbitgo, margueriteblair, pranavjain, islamaminbitgo, mkottaichamy, zahin-mohammad, mohammadalfaiyaz_bitgo) were replaced by new maintainers (louib-bitgo, bitgobot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.2
11 findingsAll previous maintainers (pengyuc_bitgo, dhoffmann, bitgoaaron, mmcshinsky-bitgo, ericcrosson-bitgo, johntzanakakisbitgo, margueriteblair, pranavjain, islamaminbitgo, mkottaichamy, zahin-mohammad, mohammadalfaiyaz_bitgo) were replaced by new maintainers (louib-bitgo, bitgobot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.1
11 findingsAll previous maintainers (pengyuc_bitgo, dhoffmann, bitgoaaron, mmcshinsky-bitgo, ericcrosson-bitgo, johntzanakakisbitgo, margueriteblair, pranavjain, islamaminbitgo, mkottaichamy, zahin-mohammad, mohammadalfaiyaz_bitgo) were replaced by new maintainers (louib-bitgo, bitgobot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.9
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.6.8
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.6.7
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.6.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.4.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.3
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.