@bitgo/wasm-utxo
WebAssembly wrapper for rust-bitcoin (beta)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): WASM binary is this package's compiled build artifact, not a backdoor. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Major version bump with WASM build artifacts; large file count expected for this package type. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): BitGo org publishes via GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from bitgobot to GitHub Actions is a CI/CD migration pattern consistent with SLSA attestation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): louib-bitgo is a BitGo org member; addition consistent with legitimate team expansion. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): @bitgo scoped package from established BitGo publisher; stub/placeholder releases are normal for this org. | ai |
Versions (showing 85 of 85)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.27.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.26.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.25.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.24.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.23.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.22.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.21.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.21.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.20.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.19.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.18.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.17.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.15.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.14.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.14.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.13.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.12.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.11.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.11.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.10.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.9.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.8.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.8.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.7.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.6.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.5.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.4.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.3.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.2.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.1.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.0.2 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.0.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.0.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 3.1.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 2.1.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.44.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.43.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.42.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.41.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.40.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.39.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.38.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.37.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.36.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.35.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.34.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.33.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.32.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.31.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.30.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.29.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.28.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.27.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.26.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.25.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.24.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.23.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.22.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.21.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.20.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.19.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.18.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.17.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.16.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.15.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.14.1 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.14.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.13.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.12.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.11.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.10.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.9.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.8.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.7.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.6.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.5.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 1.4.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 1.3.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v4.27.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.26.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.25.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.24.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.22.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.19.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.2
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-03-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.0.1
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-03-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.0.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-03-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.1.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-03-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.0.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-03-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.1.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-03-05, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-03-04, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.44.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.43.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-25, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.42.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.41.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.40.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.39.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.38.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.37.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.36.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.35.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-07, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.34.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-05, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.33.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-04, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.32.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-02-03, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.31.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-30, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.30.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-29, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.29.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-28, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.28.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-28, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.27.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.26.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.25.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.24.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.23.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.22.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-09, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.21.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-09, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.20.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-07, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.19.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-05, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.18.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2026-01-05, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.17.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-12-22, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.16.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-12-22, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.15.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-12-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.14.1
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-12-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.14.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-12-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.13.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-12-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.12.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-12-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.11.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-12-03, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.10.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-12-02, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.9.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-29, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.8.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.7.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.6.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.5.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.4.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/cjs/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/esm/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.3.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/browser/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/node/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.2.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/browser/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/node/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.1.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/browser/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/node/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/browser/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/node/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.2
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/browser/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm • dist/node/js/wasm/wasm_utxo_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (bitgobot) on 2025-11-07, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.