@blackbelt-technology/pi-agent-dashboard

Web dashboard for monitoring and interacting with pi agent sessions

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

mbotondmrbencerobertcsakanynorbert.herczeg

Keywords

pi-package

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

Source	Rule	Reason	Accepted by	When
semgrep	semgrep:hex-decode	AI (semgrep): Hex decode used for timingSafeEqual key comparison, not payload hiding.	ai	2026/07/20
semgrep	semgrep:ssh-key-access	AI (semgrep): Test file exercising ~/.ssh path resolution, not real credential access.	ai	2026/07/20
semgrep	semgrep:child-process-spawn	AI (semgrep): Same RPC keeper spawn logic, dual-use and expected for this CLI/daemon.	ai	2026/07/20
semgrep	semgrep:child-process-import	AI (semgrep): RPC keeper module legitimately spawns the agent process; not arbitrary exec.	ai	2026/07/20
semgrep	semgrep:dll-hijacking-commands	AI (semgrep): Legitimate cross-platform 'open file' implementation using rundll32 url.dll.	ai	2026/07/20
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@blackbelt-technology/pi-dashboard-server	AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; declared as dep but re-exported rather than directly imported.	ai	2026/04/30
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@blackbelt-technology/pi-dashboard-web	AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; declared as dep but re-exported rather than directly imported.	ai	2026/04/30
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@blackbelt-technology/pi-dashboard-extension	AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; declared as dep but re-exported rather than directly imported.	ai	2026/04/30
semgrep	semgrep:etc-passwd-access	AI (semgrep): Fires in path-traversal rejection test asserting /etc/passwd is blocked — not credential harvesting.	ai	2026/04/29
install-scripts	install-script:postinstall	AI (install-scripts): Fixes pty permissions for terminal emulation — expected for a Pi dashboard with terminal features.	ai	2026/04/29
semgrep	semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip	AI (semgrep): Fires in CORS test asserting 127.0.0.1 localhost is allowed — not a malicious outbound connection.	ai	2026/04/29
semgrep	semgrep:silent-process-exec-var	AI (semgrep): Same test-file dummy process spawn as silent-process-exec — benign test fixture.	ai	2026/04/29
semgrep	semgrep:silent-process-exec	AI (semgrep): Fires in test file spawning a dummy sleep process to test headless shutdown logic — not a reverse shell.	ai	2026/04/29
semgrep	semgrep:env-spread	AI (semgrep): Fires in test files saving/restoring process.env — standard test pattern, not credential exfiltration.	ai	2026/04/29

Versions (showing 9 of 9)

Version	Deps	Published
0.6.0	3 / 9	2026-07-20
0.5.4	3 / 5	2026-05-26
0.4.3	3 / 4	2026-04-30
0.4.2	3 / 4	2026-04-30
0.4.1	3 / 4	2026-04-27
0.2.9	3 / 4	2026-04-16
0.2.8	3 / 4	2026-04-16
0.2.5	3 / 4	2026-04-16
0.2.0	3 / 4	2026-04-13

v0.6.0

3 findings

HIGH ssh-key-access: packages/server/src/lib/__tests__/resolve-file-mention.test.ts:54 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft Source: https://github.com/BlackBeltTechnology/pi-agent-dashboard/blob/53c737b1bae56fcd8e02a93ae921b83de19df343/packages/server/src/lib/__tests__/resolve-file-mention.test.ts#L54 52 | await fsp.mkdir(path.join(home, ".ssh"), { recursive: true }); 53 | await fsp.writeFile(path.join(home, ".ssh", "id_rsa"), "PRIVATE\n"); > 54 | const res = await resolveFileMention("~/.ssh/id_rsa", { cwd }); 55 | expect(res).toBeNull(); 56 | });

HIGH dll-hijacking-commands: packages/server/src/system-open-capability.ts:63 semgrep

DLL side-loading command detected — potential DLL hijacking Source: https://github.com/BlackBeltTechnology/pi-agent-dashboard/blob/53c737b1bae56fcd8e02a93ae921b83de19df343/packages/server/src/system-open-capability.ts#L63 61 | export function buildOpenCommand(platform: NodeJS.Platform, resolved: string): OpenerCommand { 62 | if (platform === "darwin") return { cmd: "open", args: [resolved] }; > 63 | if (platform === "win32") return { cmd: "rundll32", args: ["url.dll,FileProtocolHandler", resolved] }; 64 | return { cmd: "xdg-open", args: [resolved] }; 65 | }

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.4

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.5

2 findings

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: robertcsakany → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-16, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (robertcsakany) on 2026-04-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.