@blockly/plugin-workspace-search
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package now published via GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; consistent with org-level automation replacing a bot account. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of prior Google-affiliated maintainer consistent with org transition; no takeover indicators. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Google Blockly package; lack of Sigstore attestation is a process gap, not a security indicator. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): maribethb is a known Google Blockly team publisher with 136 approved packages; transition appears legitimate. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.1.8 | 0 / 6 | |
| 10.1.7 | 0 / 6 | |
| 10.1.6 | 0 / 6 | |
| 10.1.4 | 0 / 6 | |
| 10.1.3 | 0 / 6 | |
| 10.1.2 | 0 / 6 | |
| 10.1.1 | 0 / 6 | |
| 10.1.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 10.0.1 | 0 / 6 | |
| 10.0.0 | 0 / 6 |
v10.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.