@blocknote/mantine
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:./dist/blocknote-mantine.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified Vite build output, not obfuscation; stable for this package's dist. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): gitHead dropped when moving to CI/CD trusted-publisher flow with SLSA attestation; benign environment change. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/blocknote-mantine.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified Vite/rollup build output with readable identifiers; no obfuscation signature or malicious behavior. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:use-prefers-color-scheme | AI (dependencies): Small, legitimate utility dep used for theme detection; no malicious history. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react-dom | AI (phantom-deps): Peer dependency used via config/build tooling, not a direct import concern. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; legitimate automation change. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@mantine/utils | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dep referenced in config only; stable pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 99)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.52.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 0.51.4 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.51.3 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.51.2 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.51.1 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.51.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.50.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.49.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.48.1 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.48.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.47.3 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.47.2 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.47.1 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.47.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.46.2 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.46.1 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.46.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.45.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.44.2 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.44.1 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.44.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.43.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.42.3 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.42.2 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.42.1 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.42.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.41.1 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.41.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.40.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.39.2 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.39.1 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.39.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.38.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.37.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.36.1 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.36.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.35.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.34.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.33.0 | 6 / 10 | |
| 0.32.0 | 6 / 10 | |
| 0.31.3 | 6 / 10 | |
| 0.31.2 | 6 / 10 | |
| 0.31.1 | 6 / 10 | |
| 0.31.0 | 6 / 10 | |
| 0.30.1 | 6 / 10 | |
| 0.30.0 | 6 / 10 | |
| 0.29.1 | 6 / 11 | |
| 0.29.0 | 6 / 11 | |
| 0.28.0 | 6 / 11 | |
| 0.27.2 | 6 / 11 | |
| 0.27.0 | 6 / 11 |
v0.52.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.29.1
4 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nperez0111.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (nperez0111) than the most recent previously approved version (matthewlipski) on 2025-04-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.29.0
4 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nperez0111.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (nperez0111) than the most recent previously approved version (matthewlipski) on 2025-04-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.28.0
4 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nperez0111.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (nperez0111) than the most recent previously approved version (matthewlipski) on 2025-04-07, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.27.2
4 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nperez0111.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (nperez0111) than the most recent previously approved version (matthewlipski) on 2025-04-05, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.27.0
4 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nperez0111.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (nperez0111) than the most recent previously approved version (matthewlipski) on 2025-04-04, but nperez0111 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.