@blockprotocol/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped @blockprotocol/core is unrelated to cors; levenshtein match is coincidental. | ai |
v0.1.5
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (hashdotai) than the most recent previously approved version (cmorinan) on 2026-06-03, but hashdotai is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.1.4
2 findingsPackage name '@blockprotocol/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.