@blocks-network/cli-linux-x64
Blocks CLI binary for Linux x64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA attestation; consistent with automated release pipeline. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package is explicitly a platform binary distribution; bundled binary is the intended artifact, not a backdoor. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.65 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.64 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.63 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.62 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.61 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.60 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.59 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.58 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.57 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.56 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.54 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.53 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.52 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.51 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.50 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.49 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.48 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.47 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.46 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.44 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.65
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.64
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.63
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.62
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.61
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.60
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.59
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.58
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.57
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.56
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.54
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.53
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.52
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.50
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.49
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.48
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.47
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.46
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.44
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • blocks
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.