@bolttech/atoms-button
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Org-wide pattern; no provenance across all @bolttech packages, stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.29.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.29.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.28.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.28.0 | 6 / 0 |
v0.29.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.29.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.28.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.28.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.