@bolttech/atoms-button
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Org-wide pattern; no provenance across all @bolttech packages, stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.29.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.29.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.29.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.28.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.28.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.27.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.27.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.26.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.24.5 | 6 / 0 |
v0.27.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (lukaspiccinibt) than the most recent previously approved version (danielkhalebbatista) on 2024-09-18, but lukaspiccinibt is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.27.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.26.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.24.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.