@bolttech/atoms-input
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all @bolttech packages; org does not publish with Sigstore provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.29.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.28.2 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.28.1 | 8 / 0 | |
| 0.28.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 0.27.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.27.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.26.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.26.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.25.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.24.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.23.0 | 7 / 0 |
v0.28.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (lukaspiccinibt) than the most recent previously approved version (andsfranbolt) on 2025-03-03, but lukaspiccinibt is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.27.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (andsfranbolt) than the most recent previously approved version (lukaspiccinibt) on 2024-12-12, but andsfranbolt is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.27.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.26.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (lukaspiccinibt) than the most recent previously approved version (danielkhalebbatista) on 2024-09-10, but lukaspiccinibt is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.26.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.25.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (danielkhalebbatista) than the most recent previously approved version (lukaspiccinibt) on 2024-09-04, but danielkhalebbatista is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.24.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (danielkhalebbatista) than the most recent previously approved version (lukaspiccinibt) on 2024-09-02, but danielkhalebbatista is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.23.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.