@boundaryml/baml-darwin-x64
BAML typescript bindings (package.json)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
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Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.222.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.221.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.220.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.219.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.218.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.218.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.217.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.216.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.215.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.215.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.214.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.213.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.220.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.219.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.218.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.218.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.217.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.216.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.215.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.215.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (sxlijin) on 2025-12-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.214.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.213.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.