@browserbasehq/browse-cli
Browser automation CLI for AI agents, built on Stagehand
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase explained by bundling @browserbasehq/stagehand SDK replacing lighter ai/openai deps. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation is a legitimate and more secure publish pattern for this org. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance replaces gitHead as the source-commit link; absence is expected in this publish flow. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:commander | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in package.json deps; CLI tool expected to use commander. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pino-pretty | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in package.json deps; used in compiled dist bundle. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ws | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in package.json deps; used in compiled dist, not directly imported in source files. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@browserbasehq/stagehand | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep declared in package.json; used in compiled dist bundle. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:node-html-markdown | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in package.json deps; used in compiled dist bundle. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pino | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in package.json deps; used in compiled dist bundle. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dotenv | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in package.json deps; used in compiled dist bundle. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.1 | 7 / 9 | |
| 0.6.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 0.5.0 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.4.2 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.4.1 | 6 / 7 | |
| 0.4.0 | 6 / 7 | |
| 0.1.3 | 9 / 10 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 10 |
v0.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.