@bryntum/scheduler
Bryntum Scheduler placeholder package
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Bryntum placeholder package; postinstall.js is a documented install-guide script for their private registry auth flow. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.2.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.2.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.2.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.1.2 | 0 / 0 |
v7.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.