@bufbuild/cel
A CEL evaluator for ECMAScript
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:peggy-ts | AI (npm-metadata): Dev-only dependency used for parser generation; does not affect runtime consumers. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/cjs/eval.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled CEL evaluator code with Apache-2.0 header; no actual network calls or malicious exec. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/esm/eval.js | AI (source-diff): ESM variant of same clean CEL evaluator code; false positive. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/esm/plan.js | AI (source-diff): ESM variant of same clean CEL planner code; false positive. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/cjs/plan.js | AI (source-diff): Compiled CEL planner code; imports are all @bufbuild/* packages, no malicious behavior. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Both publishers are buf.build org accounts; internal maintainer rotation within the same org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Bufbuild org package; lack of Sigstore attestation is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 2 |
v0.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.3.0
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.