@bufbuild/protovalidate
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/cjs/gen/buf/validate/validate_pb.js | AI (source-diff): Base64-encoded protobuf file descriptor passed to fileDesc(); standard bufbuild codegen pattern, not malicious. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/esm/gen/buf/validate/validate_pb.js | AI (source-diff): Same base64 protobuf descriptor pattern in ESM build; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
v1.1.1
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.