@bunny.net/datocms-plugin
Integrate bunny.net storage in your datocms
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-D44cXLrA.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-minified frontend bundle for a DatoCMS plugin; minification is expected and benign for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/assets/index-D44cXLrA.js | AI (source-diff): Network calls are fetch() for modulepreload; dynamic code is standard module pattern from Vite build, not dropper behavior. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash-es | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled output; lodash-es tree-shaken at build time, not directly imported in analyzed source. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:datocms-react-ui | AI (phantom-deps): DatoCMS UI lib consumed in bundled dist; phantom-dep is a false positive for this build setup. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react | AI (phantom-deps): Vite-bundled plugin; React is consumed at build time and not directly imported in analyzed source. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@tanstack/react-virtual | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled Vite output; @tanstack/react-virtual consumed at build time. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:datocms-plugin-sdk | AI (phantom-deps): DatoCMS SDK consumed in bundled dist; phantom-dep is a false positive for this build setup. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react-dom | AI (phantom-deps): Same Vite-bundle pattern; react-dom consumed at build time. | ai |
v0.1.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.