@buoy-gg/bottom-sheet
bottom-sheet package
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Postinstall is a benign echo message; no code execution. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@buoy-gg/shared-ui | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep in a monorepo; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai |
v2.1.14
2 findingsScript: echo "Run pnpm build to compile this package"
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.13
2 findingsScript: echo "Run pnpm build to compile this package"
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.11
2 findingsScript: echo "Run pnpm build to compile this package"
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.