@buoy-gg/events
events package
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Postinstall is a benign echo message; no executable code or network calls. | ai |
v2.1.14
2 findingsScript: echo "Run pnpm build to compile this package"
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.12
2 findingsScript: echo "Run pnpm build to compile this package"
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.