@c-rex/services
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal monorepo package with 53 versions; sparse metadata is consistent with org-internal tooling, not spam. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@c-rex/utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope (@c-rex); likely used transitively or re-exported rather than directly imported. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.19 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.1.18 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.1.13 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.1.12 | 3 / 9 |
v0.1.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.