@canonical/design-tokens
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@canonical/terrazzo-lsp | AI (dependencies): Same-org (@canonical) dep directly used as the terrazzo-lsp binary; consistent with package purpose. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Canonical org package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.5.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.5 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.4 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.3 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.3.3 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 4 |
v0.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.