@canonical/typescript-config-lit
Canonical's standard TypeScript configuration for Lit Web Components projects
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.33.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.32.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.31.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.30.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.29.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.27.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.26.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.25.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.24.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.23.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.22.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.21.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.17.1 | 1 / 3 |
v0.33.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.32.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.31.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.30.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mariadias143) on 2026-07-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.29.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mariadias143) on 2026-07-03, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.